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The increasing number of Chinese citizens living, working 
and travelling abroad as part of China’s rise has created an 
obligation for the People’s Republic of China to protect them. 
This is particularly the case in the South Pacific, where anti-
Chinese riots in 2006 and 2009 led to some of the earliest 
examples of ‘overseas citizen protection’. 
The Chinese leadership had previously assumed that, in 
most cases, other powers would evacuate Chinese citizens 
along with their own from situations of unrest abroad, but 
this has changed in the last decade, leading to new policies 
and capabilities that have in turn generated new expectations 
among the Chinese population. This phenomenon can be 
explained as the response of a rising power needing to protect 
its people and interests overseas as its influence expands. It 
could also be seen as a justification for the projection of power 
to underwrite China’s growing stake in world affairs. Part 1 
of this series examines this trend, while Part 2 investigates a 
recent and highly nationalistic genre of Chinese movies used 
by the former to explain the latter in a clear move to establish 
such operations by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as ‘the 
new normal’ for both domestic and international audiences.
Policy and precedent
China’s 1982 constitution expresses the state’s intention to 
protect its people and interests abroad, but it didn’t have the 
capacity to enforce its policy of overseas citizen protection (
海外公民保护) until this century. The stimulus for change 
arrived in 2004 when 14 Chinese workers were killed in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The domestic uproar caused the 
Chinese Communist Party (the Party) to acknowledge that 
large numbers of Chinese were living in high-risk environments 
overseas (Zerba 2014:1093–1112).
A 2014 study revealed China had started to conduct 
small-scale evacuations using non-military means to extract 
citizens in times of crisis or disaster from the Solomon 
Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga and Lebanon in 2006; Chad 
and Thailand in 2008; and Haiti and Kyrgyzstan in 2010 
(Duchâtel et al. 2014:46, 47). Previously, the only evacuations 
of note had been from Indonesia in the mid-1960s and 
Kuwait in 1990. The largest Chinese evacuations to date 
occurred in 2011 during the Arab Spring uprisings, when 
China retrieved 1800 citizens from Egypt, 2000 from Syria 
and 35,860 from Libya, along with 9000 from Japan after the 
Tohoku earthquake. A reported 48,000 Chinese evacuated in 
2011 was more than five times the total number evacuated 
between 1980 and 2010 (ibid.:48). 
The evacuation from Libya was the first to significantly 
involve the PLA, largely in a coordination role, with limited 
assistance from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA 
Navy (PLAN). This operation saw 35,860 overseas Chinese 
evacuated over 12 days using 74 civilian aircraft, 14 ships and 
approximately 100 buses (Zerba 2014:1101). This gave the 
Chinese military a reason to purchase more amphibious and 
airlift capability for contingencies where civilian charter would 
not be possible, such as in landlocked countries or higher 
threat environments (ibid.:1107).
The evacuation from Yemen in 2015, carried out exclusively 
by the military, was the first time the Chinese navy had also 
evacuated citizens of other countries. Between 30 March and 
2 April 2015, the naval command diverted a Chinese flotilla of 
three PLAN vessels from a counter-piracy mission in the Gulf 
of Aden to the Port of Aden. They evacuated 629 Chinese 
nationals and 279 foreign citizens from 15 other nations to 
Djibouti (Danlu 4/4/2015; Gang 23/4/2015; Liping 8/3/2018). 
Chinese observers viewed the operation as a successful 
demonstration of the navy’s new rapid-reaction capabilities, 
developed through missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the 
Somali coast (Gang 23/4/2015).
Capability and expectation
As China’s state and non-state overseas interests have grown 
so has the military’s ability to protect them, satisfying the 
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expectations of an expanding, social media-savvy middle class. 
The geostrategic requirements of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road 
Initiative are reflected in China’s Military Strategy 2015, which 
required the PLA to develop a force structure able to ‘protect the 
security of strategic SLOC and overseas interests’. Accordingly, 
the Central Military Commission decided last year to expand the 
PLA Marine Corps from 20,000 to 100,000, with many stationed 
overseas. A significant portion of these marines will be based 
at China’s first declared overseas military bases — in the port 
of Obock in Djibouti with more likely to be based at Gwadar in 
Pakistan. These marines will protect Chinese oil imports from 
the Middle East at strategic nodes along the ‘Belt and Road’. 
The Marine Corps and bases are part of China’s strategy 
of ‘far seas protection’ (远海护卫) which requires the navy to 
safeguard overseas interests, including resources, strategic sea 
lanes, overseas citizens, investments, and commercial entities 
(China’s Military Strategy 2015). It has led to the development 
of a blue water navy capable of operating globally with aircraft 
carrier and amphibious capabilities (Chan 13/3/2017).
Accidental friction
As the PLA’s capability to project force and protect Chinese 
citizens overseas continues to grow, so does the Party’s 
readiness to use the policy of overseas citizen protection and 
the Chinese people’s expectation that they will do so. As China’s 
global interests, diaspora and footprint continue to expand, 
this may result in unexpected frictions when overseas citizen 
protection is applied to situations outside China’s traditional 
core interests. 
An example of this would be a recurrence of the anti-
Chinese riots experienced in Tonga and Solomon Islands in 
2006 and PNG in 2009. Significant numbers of Chinese citizens 
are often at risk in Melanesia, where traditional partners (such 
as Australia, New Zealand or the United States) expect to 
provide the forces for evacuation and, if necessary, stabilisation 
support. Without adequate preparation, clear communication 
and shared understanding, an evacuation operation by the PLA 
in the South Pacific could contribute to, or generate, unintended 
consequences, including questions of sovereignty, citizenship 
and jurisdiction. Such an eventuality has the potential to generate 
what has been described elsewhere as ‘accidental friction’ 
(Connolly 2015, 2016 and 5/6/2017). 
Forthcoming
Part 2 of this series explores recent trends in Chinese movies 
used to generate patriotic pride in domestic audiences, while 
also attempting to normalise the perception of Chinese power 
projection within the international community. 
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